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TRIBAL CANNABIS: SOLUTION TO OKLAHOMA PUBLIC
EDUCATION UNDERFUNDING
Kaimbri White*
Introduction
Oklahoma public education, along with the educational systems in every
state, experienced a huge cut in funding after the recession of 2008. 1 While
many states rebounded after the recession, Oklahoma continues to cut
funding, resulting in one of the lowest average per pupil budgets in the
country.2 This Comment proposes a progressive solution to Oklahoma’s
shortage in public education funding, which consists of anticipating the
inevitable legalization of cannabis in the State of Oklahoma and
monopolizing on state-tribal relationships beforehand.3 While focusing on
tribes’ unique sovereign and exemption status in respect to state taxation
and regulation, Oklahoma has in the past successfully orchestrated
agreements with tribes for gaming. 4 Today, Oklahoma has a unique
opportunity to model marijuana compacts after the state’s successful
gaming compacts in order to create a new revenue stream that bridges the
gap in educational funding. By signing compacts and effectively creating
quasi-state law to legalize cannabis in Indian Country, Oklahoma would
benefit from a percentage of tribal cannabis sales, much like its current
receipt of tribal gaming fees. If, however, Oklahoma waits until cannabis
legalization in the state, it will forfeit this advantageous position. Once
* Third year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. This piece was written
and selected for publication prior to Oklahoma becoming the thirty-first state in the United
States to legalize medical marijuana, on June 26, 2018.
1. Gene Perry, Oklahoma Continues to Lead U.S. for Deepest Cuts to Education,
OKLA. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 16, 2014), https://okpolicy.org/oklahoma-continues-lead-u-sdeepest-cuts-education/.
2. Id.
3. Melinda Smith, Comment, Native Americans and the Legalization of Marijuana:
Can the Tribes Turn Another Addiction into Affluence?, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 507, 519
(2014-2015); Lauren Adornetto, Comment, Indian Country Complexities and the Ambiguous
State of Marijuana Policy in the United States, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (2017). The
background for this Comment has been based upon the historical summaries provided by
these earlier articles.
4. OKLA. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, 2016 ANNUAL IMPACT : STATEWIDE ECONOMIC
IMPACTS FROM OKLAHOMA TRIBAL GOVERNMENT GAMING 8 (2016), https://oiga.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/OIGA-Impact-Report-2016.pdf; see Model Tribal Gaming
Compact, 3A OKLA. STAT. § 281 (2011 & Supp. 2013).
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Oklahoma legalizes cannabis, tribes who grow on tribal lands will be
exempt from paying taxes on any revenue generated under the umbrella
protections of tribal sovereignty. There are many obstacles standing
between Oklahoma tribes and tribal cannabis, but none of these obstacles
are insurmountable, especially when tribal cannabis serves as a potential
solution to Oklahoma’s underfunded public education issues. Lawmakers
could find immense motivation to back a responsible and highly regulated
tribal cannabis program if it meant funding for public education in
Oklahoma and giving Oklahoma children an education they deserve.
I. The Problem
A state’s power over school finance is derived from the education clause
in each state’s constitution, which establishes the legal standard for the
quality of public education in that state and, as a minimum, mandates that
public schools be free. 5 States’ sole authority over education traces back to
federalism and separation of powers. However, even though states are
responsible for implementing their own budgets, certain public-school
systems previously have sought legal action, in both state and federal
courts, disputing budget allocations. 6 The main claim in these lawsuits is
that state legislators responsible for public school funding have “failed to
fulfill [their] constitutional obligation to provide for adequate education” as
enumerated in the education clause of that state’s constitution.7
A. State of Public Education in Oklahoma
Last summer, the Oklahoma City Public Schools district announced its
intention to sue the state of Oklahoma for educational underfunding after
the release of the 2017 state fiscal budget cuts. 8 Public school officials
unanimously voted in a board meeting to pursue legal action against the
Oklahoma Legislature for ignoring its “‘constitutional responsibility’ to
5. The State Role in Education Finance, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug 20,
2018, 7:05 AM), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/state-role-in-education-finance.
aspx.
6. John Dayton, Serrano and Its Progeny: An Analysis of 30 Years of School Funding
Litigation, 157 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 447, 448-49 (2001).
7. See William F. Dietz, Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform
Litigation, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1193, 1194 (1996).
8. Associated Press, Oklahoma City Public Schools to Sue State Legislature, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP.: BEST STATES (Aug. 22, 2017, 6:15 PM), https://www.usnews.com/
news/best-states/oklahoma/articles/2017-08-22/oklahoma-city-public-schools-to-sue-statelegislature [hereinafter Oklahoma City Public Schools to Sue].
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provide textbooks for every child by eliminating funding for instructional
materials.”9 The district claims that, due to budget cuts, schools are unable
to make ends meet, important programs are being cut, and the standard of
public education in Oklahoma public schools is suffering. 10
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,11 Oklahoma pays its
teachers less than any other state with an average salary of $42,460, as
compared to neighboring states such as Texas, whose median salary is
$55,500.12 The many teachers leaving Oklahoma to pursue teaching
opportunities and increased salaries in neighboring states has left Oklahoma
with an ever-increasing teacher shortage. 13 Shawn Hime, the Executive
Director of the Oklahoma State School Boards Association, described
Oklahoma’s “hemorrhaging” of teachers to neighboring states as a shining
example of “what it looks like when a state fails its schools and its
children.”14 When states have a shortage of qualified teaching applicants, its
schools grow “increasingly reliant on filling vacancies with teachers who
have not yet completed the state’s requirements for . . . certification.” 15 This
means that in states with major shortages, like Oklahoma, the state Board of
Education committee is forced to approve “emergency teaching
certifications” to fill the vacancies. 16
Unfortunately, Oklahoma’s public education funding issues continue to
worsen. After the 2008 recession, many states cut education budgets and as
a result, lawmakers temporarily suspended their states’ standards for class
sizes and up-to-date textbooks.17 Since 2008, Oklahoma legislators “have
repeatedly voted to suspend the [educational] standards because schools
9. Id.
10. See generally id.
11. High School Teachers: Pay, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/ooh/
education-training-and-library/high-school-teachers.htm#tab-5 (last modified May 4, 2018).
12. Abigail Hess, The 5 Highest and Lowest Paying States for Teachers in the US,
CNBC: MAKE IT (July 14, 2017, 4:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/14/the-5-highestand-lowest-paying-states-for-teachers-in-the-us.html.
13. Oklahoma Schools Struggle with Teacher Shortage Despite Cutbacks, Survey
Shows, OKLA. ST. SCH. BOARDS ASS’N, http://www.ossba.org/2016/08/22/oklahoma-schoolsstruggle-with-teacher-shortage-despite-cutbacks (last visited Apr. 2, 2018) [hereinafter
Oklahoma Schools Struggle].
14. Id. (alteration in original).
15. Andrea Eger, Teacher Shortage: Oklahoma Hits Record for Emergency
Certifications After Just 3 Months, TULSA WORLD (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.tulsaworld.
com/news/education/teacher-shortage-oklahoma-hits-record-for-emergency-certificationsafter-just/article_63d0250f-1530-56d6-937e-d45ef4410eb5.html.
16. Id.
17. Perry, supra note 1.
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still can’t afford to meet them.”18 This downward trend is evidenced by the
fact that the Oklahoma State Board of Education, which issued only 32
emergency teaching certificates for 2011-12, had already issued 1429 by
August of 2017 for the 2017-18 academic year.19 The approval of
emergency teaching certifications to untrained applicants is in direct
response to the State’s widespread teaching shortage. 20 In yet another
compromise to the State’s teaching standards, Oklahoma legislators passed
a law last year extending the length of emergency certifications from one
year to two years in an effort to bridge the ever-increasing gap.21
Surprisingly, even with this exorbitant increase in emergency
certifications, Oklahoma still had over 800 teaching vacancies throughout
its public education system for the 2016-17 year.22 To make matters worse,
these vacancies did not include the number of teaching positions eliminated
altogether by districts who cited budget cuts as the “primary factor” in their
decisions.23 According to surveys conducted by the Oklahoma State School
Boards Association, in which 83% of Oklahoma school districts
participated in 2015 and 2016, and 74% participated in 2017, school
officials admitted to eliminating 589 teaching positions in 2015,24 1530 in
2016,25 and another 480 in 2017.26 With 3399 losses in the last three years,
Oklahoma truly seems to be “hemorrhaging” teachers to neighboring states
offering higher pay and better benefits. 27
The main concern with education underfunding is that by hiring
untrained teachers or increasing class sizes to help mitigate the number of
teaching vacancies, the quality of an Oklahoma child’s education decreases.
Speaking on her growing concern for children being taught by these
unproven teachers, State Superintendent Joy Hofmeister said that most
emergency-certified teachers “walk[] in the door without the training or
18. Id.
19. Eger, supra note 15.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Oklahoma Schools Struggle, supra note 13.
24. OKLA. STATE SCH. BDS. ASS’N, 2016 OSSBA TEACHER SHORTAGE SURVEY (n.d.),
https://www.ossba.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/2016-OSSBA-Teacher-ShortageReport.pdf.
25. Oklahoma Schools Struggle, supra note 13.
26. Oklahoma’s Teacher Shortage Deepens, OKLA. ST. SCH. BOARDS ASS’N,
https://www.ossba.org/2017/08/22/oklahomas-teacher-shortage-deepens/ (last visited Apr. 2,
2018).
27. Oklahoma Schools Struggle, supra note 13.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss2/5

No. 2]

COMMENTS

395

experience to be able to meet the needs of students,” showing that the lack
of people applying to become teachers in the state of Oklahoma is “a true
crisis.”28
The effects of low educational expenditures directly correlate to the
average scores on state standardized tests. According to an annual Quality
Counts report released by Education Week, “[j]ust 2.7% of eighth graders
achieve[d] advanced scores in math,” ranking Oklahoma students’ scores as
“nearly the worst standardized test performance of all states.”29 The report,
which assessed metrics such as “school finances, student achievement, and
environmental factors” to “determine the strength of [the] school system,”
ranked Oklahoma forty-sixth out of the fifty states studied. 30 Oklahoma has
one of the lowest-performing public education systems in the country,
which comes as no surprise considering that for the 2017 fiscal year,
“public education received $43.1 million less than the Legislature
appropriated” due to inadequate revenue collections. 31 Ultimately,
something must change for Oklahoma to rebound its budget and make
public education a priority again.
B. Financial Status of Oklahoma Tribes
Native American poverty is a national issue. While Oklahoma tribes,
such as the Cherokee Nation, are generally more prosperous than other
American tribes, they still often fall below the state’s median annual
household income. 32 Through the high success of state gaming compacts,
Oklahoma tribes have proven their resourcefulness and ability to manage
large gaming and hospitality operations. 33 Gaming has afforded
Oklahoma’s tribes the ability to provide better jobs and to attract tourists to
various parts of Oklahoma’s rural Indian Country.34 This economic influx

28. Eger, supra note 15.
29. The States with the Best (and Worst) Schools, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/states-with-the-best-and-worst-schools_us_588a38db
e4b0628ad613dee1.
30. Id.
31. Id.; Eger, supra note 15.
32. Gaby Galvin, Tribal Housing Reveals Inequalities in Indian Country, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP.: BEST STATES (Sept. 23, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/articles/2017-09-23/across-the-us-disparities-in-indian-country-emerge-through-tribalhousing.
33. See Randy Ellis, Oklahoma Indian Gaming Revenues Soar (Aug. 15, 2010),
NEWSOK, https://newsok.com/article/3485404/oklahoma-indian-gaming-revenues-soar.
34. See id.
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has resulted in the excess gaming funds being used to finance tribal
education, health, and social services programs. 35
Oklahoma tribes stand in stark contrast from other tribes that still rely
heavily on the federal government to fund reservation activities. In 1996,
the federal government passed the Native American Housing Assistance
and Self-Determination Act (“NAHASDA”), which allocates housing aid
distribution to tribes through block grants and loan guarantees. 36 Congress
recognized the correlation between deficient housing on tribal lands and
poverty levels and enacted the NAHASDA to help tribal governments use
federal funds to pull themselves out of poverty. In 2015, the Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma received $28.5 million from the Department of
Housing and Urban Development and used these funds to build 277 homes
for tribal members.37 This successful utilization of federal funds becomes
obvious when juxtaposed with the Navajo Nation, which received nearly
three times the funds and only built approximately one-third of the houses
the Cherokee built.38 These figures, acquired through an investigation by
Senator John McCain's office and the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs,39 show that Oklahoma tribes are excellent at allocating funds
towards the specific goal of self-sufficiency.
It is Oklahoma tribes’ resourcefulness and ability to be self-sufficient
that show their capability of responsibly legalizing tribal cannabis by
working with state officials in a non-legal state. A new, monopolized
revenue stream from cannabis could be the ultimate solution to ending
tribal poverty in Oklahoma. Tribes in Oklahoma have already exhibited
success in business and in working hand-in-hand with state regulators to
form gaming compacts. Therefore, if tribes can replicate the agreements
used for gaming, which is also still illegal in the State of Oklahoma, statetribal cannabis compacts are conceivable.

35. See id.
36. See Pub. L. No. 104-330, 110 Stat. 4016 (1996) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 41014212 (2012)).
37. OFFICE OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, INVESTIGATION OF MISMANAGEMENT OF
FEDERAL HOUSING FUNDING BY THE NAVAJO HOUSING AUTHORITY 4 (2017), https://www.
mccain.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/d43099a1-d0e9-4f51-95ef-367bcb7de1bd/investiga
tion-of-mismanagement-of-federal-housing-funding-by-the-navajo-housing-authority.pdf.
38. Id.
39. See id.
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II. The Obstacles
Underfunding in Oklahoma’s public education system could be solved
by the legalization of tribal cannabis, as tribes would be motivated to
cooperate if it also meant a permanent solution to tribal poverty. However,
there are many obstacles around which the parties would have to maneuver
in order for such a proposition to become reality. This Section seeks to
outline the potential roadblocks for the legalization of tribal cannabis in
Oklahoma. Section III then explores how the proposed solution will
successfully surmount the obstacles explained herein.
A. Jurisdiction
The most complex aspect of legalizing tribal cannabis is the
jurisdictional overlaps that arise between the respective state, federal, and
tribal governments. The federal government historically views American
Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” meaning that their
independence is not completely free of federal governance. 40 Rather, their
relationship with the United States more closely “resembles that of a ward
to [its] guardian.”41 In support of this notion, the Supreme Court of the
United States in Worcester v. Georgia found that the federal government
has sole authority over “Indian country,” indicating that states have no
jurisdiction over tribes or tribal members on tribal land because that power
is exclusively reserved for the federal government. 42 Indian Country is
defined as all “land within the limits of any Indian reservation,” “all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States,” and
“all Indian allotments” whose titles “have not been extinguished.” 43
Another well-established maxim speaking to the exclusivity of federal
control over Indian affairs is Congress’s plenary power over tribes. 44 This
means that “state laws may be applied to tribal Indians on their reservations
[where] Congress has expressly . . . provided” in federal law. 45 The
traditional idea is that states, whose power parallels that of tribes, cannot
enforce state laws upon tribal lands. However, Congress changed this

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
(1903).
45.

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
Id.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 518 (1832).
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987).
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notion with the enactment of section 7 of Public Law 280 (“PL 280”). 46
Codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1162, PL 280 effectively transfers jurisdiction of
law enforcement in Indian Country from the federal government to the
states.47 PL 280 renders tribes and tribal lands subject to state jurisdiction
via the express “federal consent” of Congress. 48
When PL 280 was initially enacted, it was applied in a mandatory
fashion to the following six states: California; Minnesota (except the Red
Lake Reservation); Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm Springs
Reservation); Wisconsin; and upon its statehood, Alaska.49 Within these
mandatory states, however, some tribes proved the existence of their own
“satisfactory law enforcement mechanisms,” which exempted them from
PL 280’s application. 50 Since the primary congressional goal behind PL 280
was to ensure adequate policing on tribal lands, these tribes proved the
capability of their own tribal police. 51
Subsequently, Congress amended the bill to include the option for states
to relinquish jurisdiction back to the federal government.52 Additionally,
any non-PL 280 state that seeks to have PL 280 apply must receive consent
of the tribes before assuming jurisdiction. 53 These amendments have
resulted in many states converting to PL 280 areas by assuming at least
some jurisdiction over crimes committed by tribal members on tribal land. 54
States added after the initial mandatory six include: Nevada, South Dakota,
Washington, Florida, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Arizona, Iowa, and
Utah. 55 Note though, “not a single Indian Nation has consented” to being
jurisdictionally subject to PL 280 since the amendment mandating tribal
consent, evidencing a strong disfavor of state authority over Indian
46. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, and 28 U.S.C. § 1360).
47. See id.
48. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S.
877, 879 (1986).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012). These states are often
referred to as “mandatory Public Law 280” jurisdictions because the majority of jurisdiction
has been transferred from federal to state governments without consent of either the tribes or
the states.
50. Ada Pecos Melton & Jerry Gardner, Public Law 280: Issues and Concerns for
Victims of Crime in Indian Country, AM. INDIAN DEV. ASSOCIATES, LLC, http://www.
aidainc.net/publications/pl280.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Country. 56 For tribes situated within PL 280 states, the state has concurrent
criminal jurisdiction with tribal police over Indian reservations. 57
As for states that PL 280 does not apply to, including Oklahoma, it is the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) police who respond to most major crimes
committed on reservations. 58 In the case of any crime listed in the Major
Crimes Act (“MCA”), which focuses on serious crimes such as kidnapping
or murder, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) also assumes
jurisdiction.59 The jurisdictional complexities intersect and overlap, with
federal law outranking the tribes’ and states’ retained powers. Tribes cannot
enact tribal laws that violate the federal government’s laws because federal
law is “the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and.” 60 The dependency of tribes’
sovereign status comes from the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, which states that in the case of a conflict between federal,
state, or tribal law, federal law reigns supreme. 61 The Supremacy Clause
gives the federal government a power that is absolute in respect to conflicts
between laws of tribes, states, and the federal government, with an example
being laws over cannabis.62
Tribal sovereignty refers to the inherent authority of Native American
tribes to govern themselves within the borders of the United States because
they possess aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute. 63
Because of the complex framework, this definition does not illuminate
exactly what benefits tribal sovereignty affords tribes. Tribal sovereign
interests include the ability to exercise “inherent sovereignty” over tribal
members and even non-tribal members within tribal territory. 64 This
sovereignty means that tribal governments dictate both the laws and who
they apply to in Indian Country with their “powers of self-government,” but
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-185); OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT’S TRIBAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS PURSUANT TO THE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT OF 2010, at 1, 4 (Dec.
2017), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/e1801.pdf.
60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5129 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-185). Title 25
U.S.C.A. chapter 45 details the protection of Indians and the conservation of tribal land
resources, illustrating that these rights have not been withdrawn and have instead been
codified as a form of further protection.
64. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981).
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this is limited to only what is “necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment.”65 Two of the benefits tribes receive from sovereign status
include their exemption status from taxes, in regards to both state and
federal taxes on revenue generated by the tribe on tribal lands, and their
immunity from lawsuits.66 Both of these benefits have immense
implications in the cannabis realm because not only are the proceeds from
tribal cannabis sales non-taxable, but the tribes are also immune from
lawsuits.67 Additionally, federal courts have held that tribal immunity
extends beyond the tribe itself to “tribal enterprises,” such as casinos or
theoretically cannabis grows, should courts determine that the grows are an
“arm of [the nation].”68 In order to qualify as an “arm” of a tribe, the
purpose of the business in question cannot merely be to generate money. 69
Instead, the respective business has to further a tribe’s “governmental
objectives” of “health and welfare” of its members.70
B. Federal Marijuana Policy
Historically, the possession, cultivation, distribution, and sale of
marijuana has been illegal everywhere in the United States, including
Indian Country, due to the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”). 71 Under the
CSA, which outlines the federal government’s drug policy, marijuana
remains a Schedule 1 substance. 72 The federal government classifies
Schedule 1 substances, like cannabis, as having a “high potential for abuse”
and “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.” 73
Despite its Schedule 1 status, many states have sought and successfully
65. Id. at 564.
66. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/rr67_284.pdf;
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
67. Freemanville Water Sys., Inc. v. Poarch Bank of Creek Indians, 563 F.3d 1205,
1207-08 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that tribes, as governments, enjoy immunity from
lawsuits much like the federal government, states, and foreign powers).
68. Inyo Cty. v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538
U.S. 701, 705 n.1 (2003); see Kiowa Tribe of Okla., 523 U.S. at 757-58.
69. See Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund, Inc., 658 N.E.2d 989, 992
(N.Y. 1995).
70. See id.
71. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-971 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-185); Menominee
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. Drug Enf't Admin., 190 F. Supp. 3d 843, 849, 854 (E.D. Wis.
2016).
72. 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(b)(1); see U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 2017 NATIONAL DRUG
THREAT ASSESSMENT 100 n. 34 (Oct. 2017), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/201807/DIR-040-17_2017-NDTA.pdf.
73. 21 U.S.C.A § 812(b)(1).
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legalized the possession, cultivation, or selling of marijuana within their
respective borders.74
States that have legalized marijuana were warned by the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) in a 2013 memorandum to adequately protect against what
the federal government considers to be the eight most pressing threats of
cannabis regulation.75 The eight threats include:
$

Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;

$

Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from
going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels;

$

Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where
it is legal under state law in some form to other states;

$

Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from
being used as a cover or pretext for trafficking of other
illegal drugs or other illegal activity;

$

Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the
cultivation and distribution of marijuana;

$

Preventing drugged driving and exacerbation of other
adverse public health consequences associated with
marijuana use;

$

Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and
the attendant public safety and environmental dangers
posed by marijuana production on public lands and;

$

Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal
property. 76

Deputy Attorney General James Cole instructed federal prosecutors
nationwide to focus their prosecutorial efforts and resources on these threats
rather than singling out those within state compliance.77 Due to confusion
74. See generally 30 Legal Medical Marijuana States and D.C.: Laws, Fees, and
Possession Limits, PROCON. ORG, https://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?
resourceID=000881 (last updated July 28, 2018).
75. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All
United States Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo] (“Guidance Regarding
Marijuana Enforcement”), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/30520138291327568
57467.pdf.
76. Id. at 1-2.
77. Id.
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surrounding how the implications outlined in the Cole Memo applied to
Indian Country, Monty Wilkinson, the Director of the DOJ, issued a
subsequent memorandum on October 28, 2014, known as the “Wilkinson
Memo,” addressing these issues. 78 The Wilkinson Memo reiterated that the
eight threats outlined in the Cole Memo should guide U.S. Attorneys in
their prosecutorial efforts against cannabis in Indian Country. 79 It is
important to note that neither the Cole Memo nor the Wilkinson Memo
forfeit the federal government’s inherent right to raid any cannabis
operation throughout the country, including those on tribal lands. 80 These
memos merely indicate the willingness of the federal government to focus
its efforts elsewhere.
One practical implication of the Wilkinson Memo is that the federal
government and its agents will treat tribal governments that decide to
legalize marijuana the same as state governments and will respect their
decision to legalize. 81 So long as tribal regulations are strict enough to
adequately protect against the Cole Memo threats, tribes and states should
escape federal intrusion into their cannabis operations. 82
The main question that looms over the legalization of tribal cannabis in
Oklahoma is whether the DOJ will work with Oklahoma tribes willing to
adhere to the Cole Memo Guidelines despite their tribal cannabis plans
conflicting with state laws. One answer could be that tribes whose
reservations are located in states where cannabis remains illegal will be left
to fend for themselves by attempting to obtain a DEA Registration
(historically unlikely) or to pass state legislation/ballot initiatives. In the
context of possible solutions, Oklahoma tribes have the best shot at
legalizing cannabis and working with state government officials to enter
into state compacts, therefore “adopt[ing] a mutually satisfactory regime for
the collection of” a cannabis tax or exclusivity fee. 83

78. Memorandum from Monty Wilkinson, Director, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All United
States Attorneys et al. (Oct. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Wilkinson Memo] (“Policy Statement
Regarding Marijuana Issues in Indian Country”), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
tribal/pages/attachments/2014/12/11/policystatementregardingmarijuanaissuesinindiancountr
y2.pdf.
79. Id. at 2.
80. See id.; Cole Memo, supra note 75, at 4.
81. See Wilkinson Memo, supra note 78, at 2.
82. See id.; Cole Memo, supra note 75, at 2.
83. 25 U.S.C. § 5123(e) (2012); see Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 514 (1991) (finding states and tribes could
reach mutual agreements for the collection of cigarette sales taxes).
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C. State Opposition to Marijuana
While Oklahoma does not have a PL 280 problem, the state, which has
voted Republican in every election since 1968, likely holds a traditionally
conservative stance against cannabis. 84 However, the tides are turning in
Oklahoma, which is evidenced by the fact that 2018 marks the first year in
history that medical marijuana will appear on an Oklahoma ballot. 85 State
Question 788the Medical Marijuana Legalization Initiativegarnered
enough votes to require its appearance on the state ballot in 2017, but there
was some pushback from state officials. 86 In fact, while enough votes were
secured and certified in September of 2016, a vote on marijuana was
noticeably absent on the ballot in 2017. 87
The reason for State Question 788’s absence from the ballot was the
alleged rewording of the Question’s title by Oklahoma Attorney General
Scott Pruitt, arguably making a vote for medical marijuana seem as though
the vote was for recreational use. 88 Pruitt’s rewrite stated that a vote “yes”
would legalize the “licensed use, sale and growth of marijuana in
Oklahoma,” changing the original title from “medical” to “licensed.” 89
Oklahomans for Health filed a lawsuit against Pruitt in the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma challenging the rewrite. 90 Pruitt was later replaced as a
defendant in the lawsuit by the current Oklahoma Attorney General Mike
Hunter.91 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in favor of Oklahomans
for Health on March 27, 2017, restoring State Question 788’s title to its
original form. 92 Most likely, State Question 788 will appear on 2018’s
general election ballot. However, the Governor might require a special
84. See generally Oklahoma Election Results 2016, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:22
AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/oklahoma.
85. See generally Oklahoma State Question 788, Medical Marijuana Legalization
Initiative (June 2018), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Oklahoma_State_Question_
788,_Medical_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative_(June_2018) (last visited Oct. 27, 2017)
[hereinafter Oklahoma State Question 788].
86. See Steele v. Pruitt, 378 P.3d 47 (Okla. 2016).
87. Oklahoma State Question 788, supra note 85.
88. Id.
89. Petitioner's Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Combined Petition to
Review the Ballot Title of Initiative Petition 412, at 4, Paul v. Hunter, 2017 OK 25, 393 P.3d
202 (Okla. 2017) (No. 115322), http://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?
db=appellate&number=O-115322&cmid=119867. Pruitt was replaced as a defendant in the
lawsuit by the current Oklahoma Attorney General Mike Hunter.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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election for the initiative. This special election would require voters to show
up on a completely separate day to cast their votes for the medical
marijuana initiative; no governor of Oklahoma has used this tactic since
2005.93
One of the main reasons state actors have fought against marijuana
legislation reform is the fear of voter disapproval. However, according to
SoonerPoll, “Oklahoma’s only independent, non-partisan pollster[,]”94 state
support for medical marijuana legalization is a strong 62%.95 In addition, in
2013 one survey showed that 81.6% of Oklahoman voters agreed that laws
regulating marijuana should be decided by the state government rather than
the federal government, 96 echoing the position of the twenty-nine other
states in the nation that have already legalized medical marijuana.97 In
response to the polling data and echoing the sentiments of the majority of
her constituents, Oklahoma State Senator Constance Johnson remarked that
“the results make you wonder what these elected officials are afraid of.” 98
With voter disapproval no longer a key concern, Oklahoma governmental
actors should be motivated to approve a solution to education funding that
involves cannabis.
State actors might be resistant towards cannabis for politically
conservative reasons, but they have already evidenced a strong motivation
to solve Oklahoma’s funding problem by somewhat liberal means. In fact,
public education underfunding has concerned Oklahoma legislators for
many years. This concern is evidenced by previous unsuccessful attempts to
solve the state’s budget issues through various means, such as the
Oklahoma One Percent Sales Tax initiative. The Oklahoma One Percent
Sales Tax Bill, otherwise known as State Question 779, called for a liberal
increase of the state sales tax by one percent and an allocation of all

93. See Oklahoma State Question 788, supra note 85.
94. History of SoonerPoll, SOONERPOLL.COM, https://soonerpoll.com/history/ (last
visited Dec. 28, 2017).
95. Bill Shapard, Absent Any Funded Opposition, Medicinal Marijuana Headed for
Passage, SOONERPOLL (Jan. 12, 2018), https://soonerpoll.com/absent-any-fundedopposition-medical-marijuana-headed-for-passage.
96. Bill Shapard, Poll: Oklahoman Views of Marijuana Are Changing, SOONERPOLL
(Sept. 23, 2013), https://soonerpoll.com/poll-oklahomans-views-of-marijuana-are-changing/
[hereinafter Shapard, 2013 SoonerPoll].
97. 30 Legal Medical Marijuana States and D.C.: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits,
supra note 74.
98. Shapard, 2013 SoonerPoll, supra note 96.
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revenue generated from the tax to go directly to public education funding. 99
Though the tax was estimated to bring in approximately $615 million per
year, Oklahoma voters rejected the proposal in 2016.100 Nearly sixty percent
of Oklahomans voted against State Question 779, indicating voters’ strong
disapproval for the increase of the state sales tax as a solution to the state’s
education funding issues.101 However, voter opposition related to increasing
state sales tax does not correlate to the proposed solution of an Oklahoma
tribal cannabis regime. While voters may be reluctant to increase general
sales taxes, it seems unlikely that Oklahoma’s voters would reject a tax on
cannabis sales. Tribes would be the ones paying the exclusivity fees for
cannabis, so voters would have to find other grounds for disapproval of
tribal cannabis.
In sum, the two obstacles for state opposition include pushback from
state legislators and rejection by Oklahoma’s voters. As for the first
obstacle, Oklahoma legislators have already proven their willingness to
solve the state’s budget issues by initiating the One Percent Sales Tax in
2016. Though Oklahoma is a fiscally conservative state and most of its
elected officials are Republicans, state officials still pushed for an increase
in taxation. This shows that state actors take public education underfunding
seriously and are willing to reach compromises to progress toward a longterm solution. As for the second obstacle, voter polls and the certification of
State Question 788 prove voters do not disapprove of legalization.
Oklahoma voters are supportive of the idea of medical cannabis. Therefore,
if the vote for tribal cannabis is premised on the idea that it would help
public education, it may motivate voters enough to pass the resolution. If
state legislators use the movement away from the state’s traditional anticannabis stance to redirect from the idea of absolute legalization and
instead focus on a more intermediate step, such as legalization restricted to
tribal lands, tribal cannabis is possible.
D. The Commerce Clause and Tribal Sovereignty
Due to its inherent Commerce Clause implications, the third threat
mentioned in the DOJ memos, which calls for protection against cannabis
traveling from an area where it is legal into areas where it is not, 102 is the
99. Oklahoma One Percent Sales Tax, State Question 779 (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Oklahoma_One_Percent_Sales_Tax,_State_Question_779_(2016)
(last visited Dec. 28, 2017).
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Cole Memo, supra note 75, at 1; Wilkinson Memo, supra note 78, at 2.
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most important issue with respect to the legalization of cannabis in Indian
Country. 103 Interstate commerce, or in this case, commerce between tribal
and nontribal lands, puts the third Wilkinson threat within the federal
government’s exclusive jurisdiction “to regulate [c]ommerce . . . among the
several [s]tates, and . . . Indian [t]ribes.”104 Tribes do not want to trigger
federal intrusion because cannabis remains wholly illegal under federal law.
This threat has already had the greatest impact on governmental scrutiny
for tribes who have employed cannabis operations on tribal lands. 105 The
fear of scrutiny is evidenced by the fact that most tribes who have started
cannabis businesses have already set up strict regulatory schemes to prevent
this sort of off-reservation transfer.106 The concern with off-reservation
implications is that when tribes enact laws that go “beyond matters of
internal self-governance” and extend to “off-reservation business
transaction[s] with non-Indians, their claim of sovereignty is at its
weakest.”107 The Cole Memo further clarifies that agents with the federal
Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) will not focus on state-regulated
protocols and will instead work to prevent the above mentioned threats. 108
If states can provide sufficiently robust regulations that satisfy federal
authorities, the federal government will cooperate with state officials to
block efforts by those who violate the state guidelines.109
In 2015, a federal circuit court solidified the “allowance” attitude of the
federal government in regards to effective state cannabis protocols in
United States v. Marin Alliance for Medical Marijuana.110 The Marin court
held that the Rohrabacher Amendment to a 2015 Appropriations Act
prevented “the [DOJ] from expending any funds in connection with the
enforcement of any law that interferes with [the state’s] ability to
‘implement [its] own state law[]’” regarding cannabis. 111 This decision was
the first case to support the DOJ memos and the federal government’s
103. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
104. Id.
105. See Marijuana Compact Between the Suquamish Tribe and the State of Washington
(Sept.
15,
2015),
https://lcb.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/Compact-9-14-15.pdf
[hereinafter Washington Marijuana Compact].
106. See id.
107. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1312–13 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1973)).
108. Cole Memo, supra note 75, at 1.
109. See id.
110. 139 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
111. Id. at 1040 (quoting Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of
2015, Pub. L. 113–235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014)).
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desire to support effective state cannabis regulation. Marin stands for the
contention that the federal government should respect state sovereignty
instead of hindering it. The federal government’s efforts and resources are
better utilized towards preventing and detecting criminal activity that is not
in accordance with either state or federal law. The federal government’s
attitude towards effective state regulation could be considered
foreshadowing for how it might treat a tribe who is able to effectively
regulate tribal cannabis operations. It must be noted, however, that
subsequent decisions have treated Marin negatively, making it hard to
know if this case provides a concrete rule barring federal prosecution of
those in compliance with state regulatory schemes. 112
Another key issue to consider is tribal sovereignty and what that means
for the existence of tribal cannabis in Oklahoma or any other state. While
nothing in the U.S. Constitution explicitly grants tribes sovereign immunity,
the Supreme Court has ruled that tribal powers are a “limited sovereignty
[that have] never been extinguished.”113 Others argue that because tribes are
mentioned in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution alongside two other
types of government, their status as independent government entities is
similar to the several states and foreign nations. 114 Indian tribes are
“domestic dependent nations” that exercise inherent sovereign authority
over their members and territories. 115 Lawsuits against Indian tribes “are
thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or
congressional abrogation.”116
Although a tribe's sovereign immunity bars Oklahoma from pursuing a
lawsuit to enforce its rights, adequate alternatives may exist. Individual
Indians employed in “smoke shops” may not enjoy the protection of tribal
sovereign immunity, as evidenced by the ability of states to collect sales tax
from cigarette wholesalers or to enter into mutually satisfactory agreements
with tribes for the collection of taxes. 117 However, the Supreme Court has

112. See United States v. Chavez, No. 2:15-cr-210-KJN, 2016 WL 916324 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 10, 2016) (distinguishing from Marin as it did not involve the dismissal of criminal
charges as a remedy for alleged violations of the appropriations acts).
113. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.01, at 207 (Nell Jessup Newton et
al. eds., 2012 ed.) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1978)).
114. Id. § 4.01, at 208.
115. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
116. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
505, 509 (1991) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 (1978)).
117. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514.
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“never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe are not liable for
damages in actions brought by the State.”118
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band, Potawatomi Indian Tribe
of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court clarified the doctrine of Indian tribal
sovereignty.119 The Court held that, under the doctrine of tribal sovereignty,
a state that has not asserted jurisdiction over Indian lands pursuant to PL
280 can collect sales taxes from sales made on Indian lands to nonmembers
of the tribe.120 However, while the Court said that tribes are expected to tax
sales to non-tribal members, the Court effectively reinforced tribal
sovereignty by reiterating that tribes still enjoy immunity from suit. 121
Therefore, a state has the right to impose sales tax on Indian sales to
nontribal members, but a state may not bring suit against a tribe to enforce
that right.
In the Potawatomi case, the court of appeals concluded that “Oklahoma
did not elect to assert jurisdiction under PL 280,” and as such, “the
Potawatomis were immune from any requirement of Oklahoma state tax
law.”122 Though this lower court seemed to suggest that the power of states
to tax came from PL 280, the Supreme Court clarified that while PL 280
might subject a tribe to state taxation if it sold to non-tribal members, the
state still has no right to enforce the taxation scheme due to the tribe’s
sovereign immunity.123 The Court held that while sovereign immunity
precluded the state from taxing sales of goods to tribal members, the state
was “free to collect taxes on sales to nonmembers.”124 Therefore, while
Oklahoma may have a right to tax gaming or cannabis if sales to non-tribal
members generate the revenue, the state still cannot sue the tribes for
noncompliance. States essentially have a right without a remedy because
the Supreme Court is unwilling to alter the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.
The main reasons Congress enacted PL 280 was to limit illegal activity
occurring on certain reservations while also supporting potentially
inadequate tribal law enforcement. 125 Congress was concerned that Indian
tribes were not adequately organized to enforce law and order.126 Due to
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
498 U.S. at 512-13.
See id. at 513-14.
See id.
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id. at 507.
Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1976).
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 848, 83d Cong. 5-6 (1953)).
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state governments’ proximity and interest in crime prevention within their
borders, Congress thought the problem “could best be remedied by
conferring criminal jurisdiction” to the states. 127 Importantly, however,
while PL 280 transferred criminal jurisdiction to states, neither the
Committee Reports, nor the floor discussions on PL 280, exhibited
congressional intent to allow states to tax Indian sales.128 Therefore,
Oklahoma’s status as a non-PL 280 state does not affect taxing Indian
sales. 129 In the context of tribal cannabis, if an Oklahoma tribe sold to nontribal members on Indian lands, the state government would have an
interest in taxation for these sales but would lack an available remedy to
collect these taxes based on the doctrine of tribal sovereignty. A state
compact would be an equitable solution to this problem, giving Oklahoma
motivation to agree to a state compact on these grounds.
In sum, the inapplicability of PL 280 to Oklahoma tribes is beneficial
rather than detrimental. Even if marijuana remains illegal under state law,
due to the inapplicability of PL 280 to Oklahoma and the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty, tribes can still enact their own laws without being subject to
the Oklahoma criminal law regime.
1. Oklahoma’s Exclusivity Fee Benefits Both State and Tribe
By working together to form a state marijuana compact, the tribes will
benefit from a monopoly on Oklahoma’s marijuana market while the state
brings an end to the shortage of public education funding. In 2015, the
Suquamish Tribe of Washington was the first tribe to successfully enter into
a state marijuana compact for the growth, sale, and distribution of tribal
cannabis while it remained illegal at the federal level. 130 The first of its
kind, the compact directly referenced both the Cole and Wilkinson memos
and their focus on the need for “strict regulation and control over the
production, possession, delivery, distribution, sale, and use of marijuana in
Indian Country.”131
While the compact notably recognizes the inability of the state to tax
tribal businesses, including cannabis, it does mandate a “tribal tax” in its
127. Id. at 380.
128. Id. at 381; Stacy L. Cook, Indian Sovereignty: State Tax Collection on Indian Sales
to Nontribal Members - States Have a Right Without a Remedy [Oklahoma Tax Commission
v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 111 S. Ct. 905 (1991)], 31
WASHBURN L.J. 130, 137 (1991).
129. Cook, supra note 128.
130. Washington Marijuana Compact, supra note 105.
131. Id. at 2.
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place.132 The tribal tax must be “at least 100 percent of the [s]tate [t]ax on
all sales of marijuana products in Indian country.”133 Under normal
circumstances, the state cannot tell tribes how to allocate their triballygenerated funds, but under the compact, the tribe must specifically “agree[]
to use the proceeds of the Tribal Tax for Essential Government Services.” 134
Importantly, while most states charge an exclusivity fee for gaming that is
paid directly to the respective state governments, tribal cannabis is
different. “Taxed” funds derived from tribal cannabis are allocated directly
back into the tribe’s own pocket for the specific purpose of strengthening
their ability to successfully run and regulate all tribal matters, including
cannabis operations.
To date, other marijuana compacts have followed Washington’s lead and
required that the funds garnered from cannabis taxation be directed back
into respective tribal governments. 135 While tribes favorably view most
states that direct cannabis exclusivity fees back to the tribes for the purpose
of strengthening tribal self-governance, it is uncertain if that would be the
case in Oklahoma. Would the State of Oklahoma look like the bad guys for
taking the taxed percentage? Today, it is not likely that the State would be
viewed negatively for taking such action. The key distinction between
Oklahoma and every other state that has entered into state compacts, such
as Nevada, California, Washington, and Oregon, is that cannabis remains
illegal in Oklahoma. While state governments where cannabis is already
legal have followed the trend of allowing the tribes to keep any taxed
revenues from cannabis sales, Oklahoma’s situation is completely different.
Oklahoma tribes will get to monopolize the cannabis market in the state;
this includes income generated from residents of neighboring states like
Texas, who already make up a large percentage of gambling patrons in
Oklahoma. Tribes would still have the option to wait until full legalization
if they wanted to avoid any sort of taxation or exclusivity fee payment. But,
since the fee would be similar to what tribes already pay for gaming and
132. Id. at 7-8.
133. Id. at 7.
134. Id. at 8; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.490 (2015).
135. See K. Alexa Koenig, Gambling on Proposition 1A: The California Indian SelfReliance Amendment, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1033, 1043-44 (2002); see also Marijuana Compact
Between the Yerington Paiute Tribe and the State of Nevada (2017),
http://marijuana.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/marijuananvgov/Content/Stay_Informed/YeringtonPaiute-Tribe-Fully-Executed(1).pdf (showing that while California did require a percentage
of tribal gaming revenue be paid to the state, those funds were then injected back into tribal
governments). Nevada followed Washington’s exact formula by requiring the tribal tax to be
spent strengthening the tribe’s own self-governance.
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would provide a monopolized market, it would be advantageous for tribes
to enter into the cannabis market prior to its legalization in Oklahoma.
2. The Trump Administration’s Stance on Marijuana
The Trump administration’s views on marijuana legalization are starkly
different than those of the Obama administration. Since President Trump
appointed Jeff Sessions as the Attorney General of the United States, he has
repeatedly announced and directed local district attorneys and the DOJ to
spearhead the fight against legal marijuana. In fact, Attorney General
Sessions is so opposed to the legalization of marijuana that he joked at his
1986 Senate confirmation hearing that pot was worse than racism. 136 Even
though Sessions has since referred to that comment as something he “do[es]
not recall [saying],”137 it still represents an administrative stance on
cannabis that is starkly different than that of the Obama administration,
which issued both the Cole and Wilkinson memos. 138
Given the current political climate, one must wonder how Trump and
Sessions might try to impede Oklahoma tribal cannabis in the future.
However, this issue will not have a solution until the current administration
reveals plans to move forward with combatting current cannabis regulation
and legalization. As recently as November of 2017, Sessions testified
before the House Judiciary Committee that both he and the Trump
administration plan to continue the Obama-era policy of respecting state
sovereignty and disallowing federal intrusion into state-legalized cannabis
operations and grows.139 Sessions initially said that “‘[the Trump
administration’s] policy is the same . . . as the Holder-Lynch policy, which
is that the federal law remains in effect and a state can legalize marijuana
for its law enforcement purposes but it still remains illegal with regard to
federal purposes.’”140 However, Sessions backtracked this stance when he
released a memo in January of 2018 directed towards U.S. Attorney’s

136. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Jeff Sessions’s Comments on Race: For the Record, WASH.
POST (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/
12/02/jeff-sessionss-comments-on-race-for-the-record/?utm_term=.5676c1fb2994 (noting
that at the hearing, Sessions said, “I thought those guys [the Ku Klux Klan] were OK until I
learned they smoked pot.”).
137. Id.
138. See Cole Memo, supra note 75; Wilkinson Memo, supra note 78.
139. Tom Angell, Sessions: Obama Marijuana Policy Remains in Effect, MARIJUANA
MOMENT (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/sessions-obama-marijuanapolicy-remains-effect/.
140. Id. Holder and Lynch were both attorneys general under President Obama.
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offices nation-wide essentially repealing both the Cole and Wilkinson
memos. 141
The practical effect of Sessions’ memo is that he placed the prosecutorial
discretion directly back into the hands of each state’s U.S. Attorney’s
office.142 While this might seem like a drastic change in stance, states like
Colorado have already released statements indicating that their prosecution
efforts will continue to focus on those breaking their state’s regulatory
guidelines on marijuana rather than prosecuting individuals trying to abide
by their respective state laws.143
Though this particular area of cannabis law might change in the future,
for now, states like Washington are leading by example of how to satisfy
federal standards for tribal cannabis operations. Ultimately, their success
comes from the fact that their agreements are the mutual production of state
and tribal governments. State-tribal marijuana compacts seem to remain the
best move forward, no matter the shifting pieces of prosecutorial guidelines.
III. The Solution
Oklahoma tribes should enter into state-tribal marijuana compacts that
are modeled after Oklahoma’s current tribal gaming compacts. In order to
motivate state actors, the compact should provide for a percentage of all
sales of tribal cannabis to be paid to the state as an exclusivity fee that is
similar to the fee paid for gaming. This will help to both smooth over
conservative concerns about cannabis legalization while providing a
solution to the problem of public education underfunding. Additionally, to
ensure the financial benefits of tribal cannabis go directly to the public
education system, the compact should include a clause similar to the one
present in the tribal gaming agreement that requires funds to be allocated
specifically to the state’s public education system. It is imperative to the
overall acceptance of the tribal cannabis regime that the funds be directly
allocated to Oklahoma’s education funding source. While tribal cannabis
would have its own unique benefits for both tribal members and state
citizens, the benefit it would provide to Oklahoma’s budget problem would
ensure that tribal cannabis was a success for everyone involved.

141. Laura Jarrett, Sessions Nixes Obama-Era Rules Leaving States Alone That Legalize
Pot, CNN (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/04/politics/jeff-sessions-colememo/index.html.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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A. A Previous Gamble That Paid Off: Indian Gaming Act of 1988
In order to achieve similarly successful results, Oklahoma should model
tribal cannabis after tribal gaming. In 2004, Oklahoma passed the
Oklahoma State Tribal Gaming Act (“Gaming Compact”), a pre-approved
gaming compact that allowed gaming on tribal lands despite the fact that
gaming remains illegal in other areas of the state. 144 According to the most
current annual impact report by the Oklahoma Indian Gaming Association,
the direct impact of tribal gaming on Oklahoma’s economy was $4.75
billion in 2015.145 Tribal gaming also stimulates the economy in indirect
ways by driving tourism and providing additional jobs through the
construction of gaming facilities. 146 These indirect sources of revenue
brought in an additional $2.2 billion in 2015, bringing the total impact of
tribal gaming on the State of Oklahoma to $7.2 billion since its creation. 147
Under the terms of the current Gaming Compact, Oklahoma tribes must
pay the state a fee based on a percentage of the revenue earned from certain
classes of games.148 Oklahoma State Treasurer Scott Meacham “said the
percentage fee assessed by the [S]tate was determined by looking at what
comparable states were receiving” at the time the compact was made. 149
According to Meacham, none of the thirty Oklahoma tribes who participate
in gaming are subject to state taxation on their gaming revenues. 150 In lieu
of this tax, the state gaming compact provides for the annual fee to be an
“exclusivity payment” owed to the state in varying percentages. 151 The
exclusivity payment has binary benefits: it encourages state officials to
work with tribes to create and maintain gaming pacts while also benefitting
tribes by giving them “a protected market for this economic activity.” 152 In
other words, Oklahoma tribes currently have a monopoly on the gaming
industry in Oklahoma because the compact only legalized gambling on
tribal lands.
144. OKLA. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 4, at 8; see 3A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 281
(West 2012).
145. OKLA. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 4, at 4.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 5.
148. Randy Ellis, Revenue from Tribal Gaming in Oklahoma Sets Record, NEWSOK
(Oct. 17, 2016), http://newsok.com/article/5522808.
149. Michael McNutt, Tribal Gaming Fees Continue to Grow for Oklahoma, NEWSOK,
(June 3, 2010), http://newsok.com/article/3465693.
150. Id.
151. Id.; see also OKLA. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 4, at 8.
152. McNutt, supra note 149 (internal quotations omitted).
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While gaming has provided a substantial financial boost to the Oklahoma
economy, equally important is the location where the money is generated.
While most Oklahoma businesses are able to thrive more easily in denselypopulated cities like Oklahoma City and Tulsa, tribal gaming is thriving in
rural markets. Gaming can only occur on tribal lands, which are mostly
rural. Tribal gaming has greatly benefitted rural areas by generating the
majority (64%) of its earnings impact. 153 According to the 2016 U.S.
Census, over 1.3 million Oklahoma residents live in rural areas.154 By
creating and making jobs available to these rural residents, who make up a
third of the state’s population, tribal gaming has helped lower the state’s
unemployment rate.155 Since its inception thirteen years ago, the success of
tribal gaming has led to increased job creation for Oklahomans. Currently,
the direct effect of tribal gaming equates to 27,944 people being employed
by the gaming industry.156 When that figure is added to the number of jobs
indirectly provided by the gaming industry, the total impact of gaming on
employment in Oklahoma amounts to 48,942 people. 157 In total, Oklahoma
casino employees’ earnings have injected $2.3 billion into the State’s
economy. 158
Tribes have also used their current monopoly on gaming to secure a
brighter future for tribal members. For many Oklahoma tribes, like the
Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw,159 gaming has proven itself as a means
to strengthen tribal self-governance by using gaming revenues to enhance
tribal capability to provide “essential functions,” such as tribal schools and
tribal utilities.160
Gaming revenues provide obvious benefits to the state’s economy and to
rural Oklahomans, but other state programs also benefit because gaming
funds have been allocated to them directly. While the exclusivity payments
are divided between “education, mental health services and state agencies,”

153. OKLA. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 4, at 5.
154. State Fact Sheets: Oklahoma, ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://data.
ers.usda.gov/reports.aspx?StateFIPS=40&StateName=Oklahoma&ID=17854 (last updated
Sept. 5, 2018).
155. See id.
156. OKLA. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 4, at 4.
157. Id. at 5.
158. Id.
159. See Ellis, supra note 148.
160. Tribal Economic Impact in Oklahoma, SOUTHEASTERN OKLAHOMA STATE
UNIVERSITY, (Sept. 1, 2017), https://online.se.edu/articles/nal/tribal-economic-impact-inoklahoma.aspx.
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the vast majority of the funds go towards public education. 161 After setting
aside $250,000 for the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and
Substance Abuse Services, 88% of the remaining revenues go directly into
the state’s education fund, known as the Education Reform Revolving Fund
or 1017 fund.162 In total, Oklahoma tribes “have paid more than $1.123
billion in exclusivity fees to the State” since 2006.163 As of 2015, Indian
gaming had contributed over $1 billion to Oklahoma’s public education
system. 164 Clay Pope, a former member of the Oklahoma House of
Representatives, described tribal gaming as “one of the best moves” the
legislature has made thus far in terms of benefiting the economy. 165
With a huge portion of the state’s educational funding relying on these
exclusivity payments, Oklahoma cannot afford to see decreases in the
amount being paid by the tribes to the state. However in 2014, the state saw
a $5.5 million decrease in payments from the 2013 fiscal year. 166 The
decline was thought to be the product of tribes diversifying casinos with
non-Class III games, such as electronic slot machines, that are not subject to
fees.167 Though the payments have made a rebound in the last two years,
Class II games are growing at a faster rate than Class III games, 168 making
the future of gaming exclusivity payments somewhat undetermined. The
gaming compact will be revisited in 2018, so the types of games charged or
the percentage cut allocated to the state in payments may change,
potentially affecting the future of tribal gaming’s contribution to public
education in Oklahoma.
As a solution to the unknown future of gaming payments, introducing a
state marijuana compact could bridge the gap in educational funding while
still remaining one step removed from full cannabis legalization. The
success of tribal gaming indicates that modeling a tribal cannabis operation
after the current gaming regulations in Oklahoma could prove beneficial to
both tribes and the state. Though cannabis remains illegal at the federal
level, tribes should be able to enjoy the development of a productive and
161. Ellis, supra note 148.
162. Id.
163. OKLA. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 4, at 8.
164. Brianna Bailey, American Indian Gaming Contributed $1 Billion to Oklahoma
Education over Past Decade, Study Shows, NEWSOK (Nov. 18, 2015), http://newsok.
com/article/5461063.
165. McNutt, supra note 149.
166. Bailey, supra note 164.
167. Id.
168. Ellis, supra note 148.
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safe marijuana industry. Importantly, however, PL 280 provides one major
restriction that could cause disparate treatment to state and tribal cannabis
grows. While PL 280 puts tribes at the mercy of the laws of the states in
which their reservation is located, Oklahoma fortunately is not a PL 280
state. While this restriction could lead to complex issues for tribes like the
Navajo, whose reservation sits in three states, Oklahoma tribes would have
the advantage of being exempt from this particular complication.
B. What Would an Oklahoma Marijuana State Compact Look Like?
Since the issuance of the Wilkinson Memo, there has been disparate
treatment of federal intrusion on tribal cannabis grows.169 Many tribes have
been successful in cooperating with their respective state governments to
form state compacts the federal government has, so far, respected. 170
Conversely, some other tribes have been subject to federal raids, the burning
of their grow sites, and even arrests of their non-tribal consultants who are
not shielded from prosecution under the umbrella of tribal sovereignty. 171
Due to PL 280, states and their inherent police powers have assumed criminal
jurisdiction over tribal lands situated within PL 280 states.172 Therefore, if
cannabis is legalized in a PL 280 state, subsequent tribal cannabis operations
will be subject to the full extent of the state’s criminal laws, highlighting the
need for strong legislative relationships to ensure adequate adherence to
emerging regulations.173
In a move consistent with the federal government’s policy reasons for
implementing PL 280, the federal government also seems to be transferring
jurisdiction for tribal cannabis regulation to the states via the Wilkinson
Memo.174 Because of this transfer of jurisdictional authority, it seems the only
169. Amber Cortes, Cannabis on Tribal Land a ‘50/50’ Gamble for Native Americans in
Washington, GUARDIAN (May 29, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/
29/cannabis-native-american-marijuana-sales-farming-washington.
170. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.490 (2015); Rob Hotakainen, Indian Tribes Fear Trump
Will Be a Buzzkill for Their Marijuana Business, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 28, 2017),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/nation-world/national/article146881809.html.
171. See Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 190 F. Supp. 3d
843 (E.D. Wis. 2016); Steven Nelson, DEA Raid on Tribe’s Cannabis Crop Infuriates and
Confuses Reformers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.usnews.
com/news/articles/2015/10/26/dea-raid-on-wisconsin-tribes-cannabis-crop-infuriates-andconfuses-reformers.
172. Melton & Gardner, supra note 50.
173. See id.
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012); Wilkinson Memo, supra
note 78.
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way for tribes to avoid federal intrusion into reservation land containing
cannabis grows is to enter into a compact with their respective state in which
they agree on terms and regulations of said operation. As for Oklahoma
tribes, the previous treatment of cannabis grows in other states serves as a
warning. The main objective of state compacts is for tribal governments to
work hand-in-hand with the attorneys general in their respective jurisdictions
to come to a contracted agreement that aligns the tribal operations with state
regulations.175 If Oklahoma tribes can find common ground with government
officials, it would be possible to legalize cannabis on reservation lands by
entering into a state compact.
Signing this sort of compact would mean that the details of the compact
would become quasi-state law, requiring state law enforcement officials to
abide by the terms in the compact.176 Because signing the compact effectuates
it into state law, Oklahoma has little to lose with respect to federal
prosecution, provided that the compact adequately protects against the threats
headed in the Cole and Wilkinson memos.177 In reality, Oklahoma would
have everything to gain, at least in this short window of opportunity. The
state could theoretically position a compact to outlive the illegality of
cannabis and reap the financial benefits all the while. This type of deal also
provides insulation and protection to tribes from state intrusion, so long as
they honor the terms set forth by the state in the compact.178 Again, the
federal government still reserves the right to intervene if the state does not
adequately protect against the Cole Memo threats.179 It is important to note,
though, that the presence of a state compact with sufficient protections
against these threats has so far resulted in the federal government leaving
alone tribes and states with progressive cannabis regulations.180
Because of the complex jurisdictional and sovereignty issues discussed in
earlier portions of this Comment, it follows that Oklahoma tribes must fully
cooperate with state government officials and prosecutors to avoid federal
intrusion and ensure success of cannabis compacts. One example of a tribe
175. See Hilary Bricken, The Suquamish Marijuana Compact: First in the State, First in
the Nation, CANNA L. BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.cannalawblog.com/the-suquamishmarijuana-compact-first-in-the-state-first-in-the-nation/.
176. See id.
177. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
505 (1991) (holding that Indian tribes are not subject to lawsuits because they are domestic
dependent nations which possess sovereign immunity).
178. See Washington Marijuana Compact, supra note 105.
179. See Cole Memo, supra note 75; Wilkinson Memo, supra note 78.
180. See Washington Marijuana Compact, supra note 105.
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that cooperated with state officials but fell short of actually entering into a
binding state compact is the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe of South Dakota.
The Tribe had an ambitious goal to open the world’s first marijuana resort in
South Dakota.181 The Tribe planned to permit sales and consumption of
marijuana to persons over twenty-one years of age within tribal lands in
accordance with a tribal vote held to legalize both medical and recreational
use.182 The Tribe stated that its intention was to open a cannabis resort where
buyers could purchase and consume cannabis on tribal property but would
not be allowed to take any cannabis off-reservation in accordance with the
third threat of the DOJ memos. Though the tribe was not officially raided, it
unilaterally chose to burn its entire crop in November of 2015 after
discussions with state and federal authorities indicating the Tribe was at risk
of being raided.183
The Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin serve as another example of a failed
attempt at approving and commoditizing tribal cannabis. The Menominee
Tribe’s government voted with a 77% approval rate to allow the cultivation
of medical marijuana and 58% approval for recreational marijuana.184 The
Tribe then began growing industrial hemp as a research project and was
subsequently raided by the DEA in October of 2015, resulting in the seizure
of over 30,000 plants by federal authorities.185
However, there is still hope for successful tribal-state compacts in
Oklahoma if tribal governments create and enforce sufficiently strict
regulations that satisfy the requirements of the DOJ memos. The most
important assurance Oklahoma tribes would need to make would be that
marijuana, even if legal on the reservation, could only be consumed on tribal
lands and could not be transported to any other areas of the state. The “offreservation” flowing of cannabis into states where it is still illegal will
assuredly trigger federal intrusion.
Both the Flandreau Santee Sioux and Menominee made fatal mistakes that
Oklahoma tribes should avoid at all cost. Neither of these tribes entered into
state compacts, and they relied solely on tribal sovereignty as support for the
legalization of cannabis on their lands, despite residing in states where

181. Emmett Reistroffer, State Forces Santee Sioux Tribe to Burn $1MM Worth of
Marijuana, MERRY JANE (Jan. 14, 2016), https://merryjane.com/news/state-forces-santeesioux-tribe-to-burn-1mm-worth-of-marijuana.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Nelson, supra note 171.
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marijuana remained illegal.186 It would be a fatal mistake for Oklahoma tribes
to not enter into state compacts to work out the jurisdictional and regulatory
complexities involved in a cannabis operation. Tribal lands are very
fractionalized, so even if tribes legalize marijuana on tribal lands specifically,
it would be nearly impossible for residents of the state to buy or consume
cannabis on tribal lands and return home without crossing over state land.
Additionally, because driving while under the influence is also a major threat
listed in the DOJ memos, Oklahoma tribes would need to work with state
officials in order to remain in compliance with the DOJ’s standards and
prevent inevitable federal intrusion for noncompliance. Oklahoma, if
successful, would be the first state to enter into marijuana compacts with
tribes while the substance remains illegal in all areas of the state.
Additionally, in Oklahoma, both the tribes and the state government are in
a unique and advantageous position to achieve success in state-tribal cannabis
compact negotiations. Tribes in Oklahoma should keep in mind that their
main goal for self-regulation is to ensure that if they sell to members of the
public, they do not allow them to consume off tribal lands. This allowance
would directly conflict with the main threat mentioned in the Cole and
Wilkinson memos, which essentially prohibits the traveling of marijuana
from areas where it is legal (tribal lands) to areas where it is not. Tribes have
a unique advantage with their sovereign status in the non-PL 280 state of
Oklahoma, which has yet to enact its own robust regulation for the
legalization of marijuana. In Oklahoma, the state could capitalize and
immensely benefit from entering into a state compact with tribes before
cannabis is officially legalized in the state. Entering into state cannabis
compacts with Oklahoma tribes could benefit the State of Oklahoma in the
same way that gaming did, by providing a lucrative source of revenue
directed to a specific use, such as education.
As long as the state and tribes work together to come to a formal
agreement, state officials could ensure that the federal initiatives are satisfied
while also making a revenue percentage part of the compact. It is important
that tribes act before marijuana is actually legalized in the state in order to
capitalize on the tribes’ unique exemption status. The downside of potentially
paying some sort of percentage to the state, even though tribes are tax
exempt, would be the price tribes are willing to pay to monopolize the
Oklahoma cannabis industry.

186. See id.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, the DOJ’s memos urge tribal governments to work hand-inhand with their respective state governments in order to enact cannabis
regulations that comply with the Cole and Wilkinson memos and avoid the
need for federal intrusion. While federal, state, and tribal governments all
reserve their own respective rights and immunities, each are trying to work
together in a cohesive manner to establish safe cannabis operations
throughout the United States. The main question examined in this Comment
was whether tribes in Oklahoma, where cannabis is still illegal, could use a
state compact modeled after gaming compacts to cultivate cannabis on tribal
lands. This cultivation would present a unique solution to both issues of tribal
poverty and the immense underfunding to Oklahoma’s public education
system. As a solution to this crisis, Oklahoma could benefit from receiving a
percentage of the revenues from tribal cannabis. The State and tribes must
realize this benefit while they still can through the incorporation of an
exclusivity fee into cannabis compacts modeled after Oklahoma’s gaming
compacts. There is currently a $40 million gap in funding for Oklahoma
public education, which only seems to grow each fiscal year, despite tribal
gaming contributions to the state. Because exclusivity fees from gaming are
decreasing, and therefore becoming unreliable for budgeting purposes, a
cannabis exclusivity fee could be just the ticket to bridge the funding gap.
Eventually, when states like Oklahoma legalize cannabis, the state will not be
able to use “exclusivity” or a monopoly on the market as a bargaining chip,
given tribes are exempt from federal taxes and from state taxes on revenues
made on tribal lands.
State-tribal cannabis compacts could make a huge difference in the quality
of public education in Oklahoma, should the state government choose to
allocate the funds where they are most needed. The biggest obstacle currently
standing in the way of tribal cannabis is the reluctance of state actors to move
towards any legalization of marijuana in the state. However, state actors
could be motivated by the lessons they learned in their dealings with the
legalization of tribal gaming in the state. By utilizing the undeniable revenue
stream tribal cannabis could provide for Oklahoma public education, it is
possible for state actors, who would otherwise oppose such an action, to
support the legalization of marijuana on tribal lands because it would ensure a
brighter future for education in the state.
Even though many obstacles stand between tribes and the legalization of
tribal cannabis in Oklahoma, none are insurmountable. Tribal cannabis is an
intermediate solution that is available to Oklahoma, should it decide that the

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss2/5

No. 2]

COMMENTS

421

need for adequately-funded public education outweighs the state’s current
ban on cannabis. It remains to be seen whether Oklahoma will consider this
unique solution to its most evident problem, the underfunding of public
education in the state.
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